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The Politicisation of Land Policy 
Reform in Contemporary Kenya
Francesca Di Matteo
Translated by Sara Stavchansky
In Kenya, as in other African countries, the colonial experience was the 
foundation of a centralised and authoritarian bureaucratic institutional 
apparatus that continued shaping the state after independence (granted in 
1963). In this former British settlement colony, state institutions, including 
those governing property rights, have been structured to provide territorial 
control,1 including through the deployment of the Provincial Administration, 
the branches of central state power in the Districts (Bourmaud 1988). The 
centralisation of state control gradually took hold in the 1970s, under 
the aegis of the first independent government. It gained strength in the 
1980s with the second president of the Republic of Kenya, Daniel arap 
Moi, when the regime turned to autocracy (Nyong’o 1989). Social and 
political movements emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in opposition to the 
dictatorial state power: they called for the reshaping of the social contract 
through the revision of the constitution (Haugerud 1997; Klopp 2001; 
Murunga & Nasong’o 2007). The democratisation of land management and 
administration systems has been an integral part of this overall movement 
calling for the restructuring of the state.
In this context in which the action of the territorial administration has 
allowed local political pluralism while framing and linking it to the central 
state through a selective redistribution of resources, i.e. a “rationalised 
clientelism” (Bourmaud 1988, 138), the institutions governing the land 
have become porous to political interference. They have thus drawn on 
the land resource, held de jure in trust by public authorities, to maintain 
clientelist networks, according to a well-known “neo-patrimonial” logic.2 
This politicisation of land governance has contributed to the exacerbation 
of conflicting community relations in many local contexts, some of 
1. The territorial nature of the colonial state (and postcolonial in its wake) in 
Kenya was conceptualised by Claire Médard (1999) in her doctoral thesis in 
Geography. She shows that the state territorialise its power through the control 
of both natural resources and populations.
2. For a discussion of the concept of “neopatrimonialism” applied not only to 
African political systems, see Bach & Gazibo (2012).
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which, as in the Rift Valley, have resonated in the national political arena. 
The analysis of the conflict dimension of land issues is fundamental to 
understanding the triggers and vehicles of reform processes in Kenya, 
both constitutional reform and land governance reform. Land disputes 
have indeed been the basis of many institutional processes (such as the 
many commissions of inquiry appointed by the Kenyan presidents in 
the 1990s and 2000s) but also of less institutional processes (such as the 
constitution of a transnational network of actors) that contributed to the 
legal-institutional transformations of the country’ systems.
From 2000 to 2010, the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
(CKRC) worked on the drafting of a new supreme law. Land reform was 
one of the pillars of the proposed constitutional changes. Not only were 
land issues incorporated into constitutional deliberations, with a chapter 
of the new Constitution fully dedicated to it, but a National Land Policy 
(NLP), was developed in parallel within the Ministry of Lands as early 
as 2004. The NLP had to unravel the land question and formulate general 
policy principles, unifying the corpus of land laws by deciding on their 
aims and their orientations. These two parallel reform processes were 
completed between 2009 and 2010. Since 2011, the legal-institutional 
framework proposed by these texts was progressively, albeit very slowly, 
put into place.
Among the salient points of land reform, the restructuring of the roles 
and functions of institutions governing property rights emerged, since 
the early 2000s, as the only policy instrument that could tackle both 
the colonial legacy and dysfunctional land administration (i.e. lack of 
efficiency and neo-patrimonial practices). Above all, it was necessary to 
deconcentrate and decentralise the politico-administrative power of the 
executive, especially limiting the hold of the president on land allocations, 
and thereby revising the legislative framework inherited from colonisation, 
now considered obsolete and plethoric. The structure of land ownership 
was also re-examined, including a number of principles that had remained 
dogmatic since independence, such as the sanctity of first registration and 
the inevitability of the individualisation of land tenure.3
From the beginning of the process of enactment of land reform provisions, 
several authors argued many actors resisted institutional change. They 
noted the “difficulties” in reforming institutions (Bassett 2017), as well as 
the existence of “counter-reform” (Klopp & Lumumba 2017) attempts by 
3. These remarks were notably expressed in the documents at the base of the 
reform elaboration: see Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, The People’s 
Choice. The Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (2002), Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal / Irregular Allocation of Public Land 
(2004), and Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009 on National Land Policy (2009).
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the political and bureaucratic class, namely the government of the Jubilee 
Coalition—in power since 2013—officials of the Ministry of Lands, and, 
more generally, all the beneficiaries of the old regime (McAuslan 2013, 
262; Manji 2014; Boone, Dyzenhaus, Ouma, et al. 2019). All these works 
differentiate the process of formulating land reform texts (the Constitution 
and the NLP) from the elaboration of laws meant to operationalise the 
reform provisions. Thus, the progressive impetus of the 2000s would stand 
in contrast to the resistance to implementation of transformative measures 
of the 2010s. But these analyses do not explain why the bureaucratic-
political establishment, beneficiaries of the old regime, would initially 
have accepted land reform. Why would blockades and sabotage attempts 
have waited for the implementation of a new law radically reorganising 
the governance and structure of property, but have quietly allowed its 
formulation and promulgation?
This chapter aims to show that resistance has been a constant feature of 
the policy process of land reform from the early stages of its formulation 
to its implementation. In order to do this, it analyses precisely the process 
of reform starting with its setting on the government agenda and exposes 
the negotiations taking place before and after the promulgation of the two 
founding reform texts. In addition, this chapter anchors the interpretive 
framework of the emergence and progress of the process of land governance 
reform in the political history of Kenya to better understand debates and 
blockages. After a brief discussion of the colonial legacy and postcolonial 
continuity of Kenya’s bureaucratic and economic-political structures, I 
will first show how the politico-land conflicts of the 1990s, particularly 
those in the Rift Valley, prompted certain stakeholders to advocate for 
policy change. I will then explain the reasons why the political system 
suddenly became more receptive to reform narratives and highlight how 
the international context contributed to the pro-reform movement as well 
as to the design of procedures for concerted decision-making. Finally, I 
will dwell on the political events that both obstructed and promoted the 
reform process.4
4. The analyses presented here are the result of doctoral research conducted 
in Kenya for eighteen months. I adopted several qualitative methods of data 
collection: semi-structured interviews with a wide range of actors (members of 
associations, public authorities, representatives of rural communities, etc.), press 
review, participatory observation in civil society and government workshops, 
notably through the integration of a non-governmental organisation lobbying 
for reform, the Kenya Land Alliance.
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1. The “Land Question”:  
Construction of a Dominant Narrative
It was expected that the transfer of power from colonial authorities to 
indigenous elites would lead to fundamental restructuring of the legacy on 
land. This did not materialise and the result was a general re-entrenchment and 
continuity of colonial land policies, laws and administrative infrastructure. This 
was because the decolonisation process represented an adaptive, co-optive and 
pre-emptive process which gave the new power elites access to the European 
economy. (Republic of Kenya 2009, 5.)
This excerpt, taken from the NLP, is meant to exemplify the political 
aspects of what is called in Kenya the land question.5 It first associates the 
land question with the incompleteness of the process of decolonisation 
during transition to independence. The colonial legacy would thus be the 
first pitfall in the resolution of problems related to land management. This 
colonial legacy refers particularly to the “historical land injustices” caused 
by the expropriation of many Kenyan populations by the colonial enterprise, 
which have never been rectified. The establishment of a settlement colony 
in Kenya is indeed the result of large-scale land acquisitions, which the 
colonial government justified “legally” by a reversal of sovereignty.6 The 
lands targeted were mainly those located in areas of high agricultural 
potential: the Central Highlands and the Rift Valley, later known as the 
White Highlands.7
Although many communities in the highlands were dispossessed by the 
colonial enterprise, the land claims of some groups in the Rift Valley, namely 
Maasai and Kalenjin, have resonated most in the national and international 
political arenas at specific historical moments, such as during the transition 
to independence in the 1960s and the return to multi-party politics in the 
year 1990. In order to understand the advent and regular resurgence of 
one of the major social cleavages structuring the partisan Kenyan system, 
it is important to note that until the 1940s, the colonial administration 
had encouraged the migration of populations deemed fit for agriculture, 
such as the Kikuyu of the central region, to the European farms of the Rift 
5. For a discussion and definition of the “land question” in Africa, and / or in 
East Africa, see Okoth-Ogendo (2007), Moyo (2008) ou Manji (2013).
6. This aspect of colonial history has been largely studied by historians and 
jurists: see Sorrenson (1968), Péron (1995), Okoth-Ogendo (1991) and Hughes 
(2006).
7. They are formed in the central region, namely the Kikuyu country, named 
after the farmers who populate this area, and the Rift Valley, where groups who 
engaged in pastoralism, but also agriculture, coexisted.
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Valley.8 In the independence negotiations, these migrations were disputed 
by the delegations representing the Maasai and Kalenjin herders and agro-
pastoralists who called themselves “indigenous” to the Rift Valley and 
feared that European farms would be handed over to the Kikuyu, who 
lived there as squatters.9 At the Second Constitutional Conference, held 
in London (Lancaster House) in 1962, the Maasai delegation demanded 
the return of 70% of the White Highlands (Kantai 2007, 109). The leader 
representing the Maasai, Justus ole Tipis, along with the representative 
of the Kalenjin, Daniel arap Moi (both from the same party, the Kenya 
African Democratic Union, KADU) and Donald Ngala, representative of 
some coastal communities—all three leaders from the periphery—defended 
the land rights of “indigenous” communities. They opposed the claims of 
the Kikuyu-dominated Kenya African National Union (KANU), under 
the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, who emphasised the rights acquired by 
sedentary communities on the basis of colonial policies (TJRC 2013, 199-
206). The criteria used to redistribute lands occupied by the British became 
the bone of contention structuring power struggles between groups. The 
KANU won the first political elections of 1963. The political project of this 
organisation became then dominant and engulfed KADU, but it could not 
suppress the claims of the periphery, bound to resurge.
The independence land deal concluded in London was condensed in 
Article 75 of the 1963 Constitution protecting land rights acquired during 
the colonial period, regardless of the process of acquisition. This article 
endorsed the spoliations of the colonial period and made any land restitution 
impossible. To appease KADU leaders and representatives of minority 
groups, Kenyatta promised that the ancestral lands would not be transferred 
to other ethnic groups, but this promise was not kept. The Africanisation 
of the White Highlands followed neither the logic of restitution to the 
first occupants (land to the “natives”) nor that of redistribution (land to 
the landless). The state orchestrated both sales of the old White Highlands 
and their financial conditions10 without any restructuring of the property 
system. The prevailing historical narrative argues that there was a quasi-
8. This is especially true before the outbreak of the political and military 
emergence known as the Mau Mau revolt, as a result of which migrations, 
including Kikuyu, were strictly controlled, and Africans residing on the settlers’ 
farms “repatriated” to the reserves: (see Kanogo 1987; Berman & Lonsdale 1992).
9. Polysemic term which, according to the historical periods and the regions of 
the country, can describe different socio-economic and political relations: see 
Kanogo (1987) for an analysis of the conditions of the Kikuyu on settler farms 
in the Rift Valley. 




ethnic monopoly of land redistribution in favour of the first government’s 
ethnic group. This narrative persisted despite the regime change at the 
end of the 1970s, which reoriented the neo-patrimonial strategies of land 
redistribution.
This moment in Kenyan history is seen as crucial because it has sown 
the seeds of discord among several groups, as their land claims have been 
neglected or even simply ignored. These claims were perpetuated and 
reaffirmed, in particular, by the use of the notion of historical land injustices. 
This notion is ambivalent and subject to successive reinterpretations 
according to the stakeholders and the context.11 What is important to 
emphasise here is that the construction of the cleavage between the Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin dominated and structured the national political scene, despite 
the salience of spoliations and injustices suffered by other groups in other 
parts of the country.
It follows that upon independence, the Kenyan economic structure 
remained intact: the role of the state remained that of “creator and protector 
of the great landowners” (Holmquist, Weaver & Ford 1994, 76). Rural 
development policies continued to be tied to the myth of the productivity 
of large farmers,12 and social inequalities were fueled by neo-patrimonial 
management of resources, including land.13 The Ministry of Lands and the 
provincial administration system in particular were caught up in this system 
of selective redistribution of resources, putting themselves at the service 
of the powerful and thus impoverishing the quality of services delivered 
to the citizens.14 Land allocations, as well as the issuance of land titles, 
played a major role in such political strategies of building and maintaining 
clientelist networks that served political and electoral purposes, especially 
since the return to multi-party politics.
11. To delve more deeply into the historical-political construction of Kalenjin 
claims, see Médard (1999) and Lynch (2011). For a necessary detour into other 
regions of Kenya, see the works on the Swahili coast: Willis (1993), Cooper (1980). 
For northern Kenya, see also Schlee (1989) and Oba (1992).
12. For a discussion of the political economy choices, see Leys (1984).
13. Jean-François Médard (1992, 191) has described the phenomenon of straddling 
between the private and public spheres in Kenya, showing how individual 
enrichment is a function of access to the state. Other authors have revealed 
that the redistribution of resources by those in power is accomplished through 
regional and ethnic affiliation: Bradshaw (1990), Wrong (2010), Boone (2012). 
For a historical discussion of neo-patrimonial logic in Kenya, see the thesis of 
Jaqueline Klopp (2001).
14. See the Ndung’u Report (Republic of Kenya 2004) for a detailed description 
of so-called irregular and illegal land transactions of which land administration 
has been responsible since Kenyan early independence years.
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Indeed, coinciding with the advent of multi-party electoral competition, 
the question of land “restitution” to the Kalenjin dominated political debate 
and the rhetoric of the electoral campaigns.15 The Kalenjin claimed to be 
doubly dispossessed, both by the British and by the distributive policies of 
the Kenyatta era, a Kikuyu president who favoured his own. The Kikuyu 
became targets of deadly attacks in the Rift Valley throughout the 1990s 
and in 2007–2008, as well as elsewhere in the country.
2. Historical and Contingent Reasons  
for the Land Reform Agenda
The concept of historical land injustices is essential to understand the 
sensitivity of the land issue in Kenya. The national land policy defines 
these injustices as having arisen from the land spoliations of the colonial 
period, perpetuated by the independent governments (Republic of Kenya 
2009, 42). This concept became very relevant beginning with the post-
election violence of 2007–2008 that threw the country into civil war 
for several months. In the wake of the 2008 National Reconciliation 
Agreement, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, inaugurated 
on August 3, 2009, was established as an instrument of transitional justice. 
In particular, it examined the extent to which post-election violence had 
resulted from historic land injustices.16 The Commission report published 
in 2013 explains that the formulation “historical injustices” was adopted in 
everyday language in Kenya as part of the social mobilisations demanding 
the revision of the Constitution beginning in the 1980s.17
The 1990s were a turning point in the launching of constitutional reforms 
as well as land reforms. First, the concerted mobilisation of various sections 
of Kenyan civil society18 exerted considerable pressure on President Moi’s 
15. The term “restitution” refers to the British, but because of the intertwining 
of ethnic and territorial claims, it is used in everyday language in Kenya to refer 
to land injustices perpetrated by independent governments.
16. In December 2007, following the denunciation of electoral fraud, violence 
erupted notably in Nairobi and in the Rift Valley, throwing the country into 
deadlock for several months, causing the death of 1,200 people and displacing 
500,000 (Human Rights Watch 2008). In the 1990s, this confliction associated 
with the electoral meetings had also affected the coastal and northern region, 
showing that the grievance was not localised but diffuse.
17. Through this term, the activists aimed to denounce the political and socio-
economic marginalisation of social groups and regions, whereas, more generally, 
this expression refers to the dispossessions and inequalities that result from the 
land policies implemented since colonisation: see TJRC (2013, 68).
18. In the 1980s and 1990s, this designation referred to the first human rights 
organisations, religious figures and organisations, student university unions, 
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regime, pushing him to establish the CKRC in 2000. This commission was 
tasked with reforming the constitution.19 Then, to understand the reasons 
that led the president to make political concessions, it is necessary to 
plunge into the internal mechanics weakening the regime. Indeed, because 
of an increasingly predatory mode of government—notably plundering 
public land and redistributing resources through new clientelist channels 
that excluded groups previously in power—President Moi renewed and 
narrowed the networks shaped by his predecessor, Mzee Kenyatta (Branch 
& Cheeseman 2008, 1-26).
Finally, added to the political practices spurring exclusion was the 
deterioration of the economic conditions of the 1970s, which led to 
exasperation of the regime autocratic style, while laying the foundations 
for the discontent of a section of society. Due to the slowdown in the 
economy, which resulted from, among other things, the implementation of 
structural adjustment plans, the nascent Kenyan middle class was unable 
to maintain high levels of consumption (Holmquist, Weaver & Ford 1994, 
90). Finally, an alliance between elements economically disadvantaged by 
the regime and international bodies were put in place. It can be said that the 
pro-democracy movement was well-anchored in the economic structure 
while also being the “product” of external forces (ibid., 96). In fact, it was 
through the action of the urban middle class, and not by peasant or worker 
organisations (largely absent from the mobilisations), that the demand for 
a return to a multi-party system took shape.
The advocacy movement for land reform has its roots and fed on the 
pro-democracy struggles of the 1980s and 1990s: it is their continuation, 
although metamorphosed. In the international context of the end of 
bipolarism, the wave of international programs of the 1990s, which 
funded advocacy activities, focused on human rights and pro-democracy 
lobbying and invested heavily in civil society organisations, designed by 
the aid industry as the democratising element in the face of predatory state 
devices.20 These aid flows led to an exponential increase in the number of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Kanyinga 2013).
cultural professionals (such as traveling and participatory theatre actors), as 
well as private sector professionals, including lawyers who actively participated 
in the pro-democracy struggle corporately and individually by providing pro 
bono legal services to political prisoners.
19. For narratives presenting a participant point of view on the momentum of 
these mobilisations and the struggles between the mobilised groups and state 
authorities, see Mutunga (1999), Mutua (2013) and Maingi (2011).
20. For a detailed reconstruction of this movement in Kenya, see Pommerolle 
(2005).
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In Kenya’s land sector, donors were indirectly influential in the agenda 
setting of land reform when funding the creation of the Kenya Land Alliance 
(KLA). The KLA was originally conceived as a platform for NGOs dealing 
with land issues. It was meant to introduce new narratives and directories 
of commitment to these questions in order to influence the decision-making 
process. The KLA is a model of political participation that was promoted 
by Oxfam GB,21 itself funded by British cooperation, strictly in connection 
with Kenyan personalities with highly-internationalised profiles.22 This 
strategy worked well: not only did the KLA form a federation of various 
organisations and gain leadership, but it also managed to impose itself, in 
the early 2000s, as a key interlocutor of governmental and bureaucratic 
land institutions. This symbolic capital was built during the formulation of 
the land policy, the National Land Policy (NLP).
It is in this context of multiple influences that, in the wake of reports 
produced by the commissions inquiring into the violence of the 1990s (Kiliku 
Commission, 1993, Akiwumi Commission, 1998), which pointed to land 
claims and their ethnicisation as the cause of the conflicts (Kameri-Mbote 
2008), President Moi established in November 1999 another commission of 
inquiry to examine the land laws in place and propose a restructuring of the 
legal-institutional system. The recommendations of the so-called Njonjo 
Commission (named after its chairman, the former Attorney General, 
Charles Njonjo), published in 2002, constituted a fundamental precedent 
for the start of the land reform process. This Commission documented the 
excessive (too many laws) and inefficient (lengthy and costly) nature of the 
legal framework governing land, while also highlighting the concentration 
of power within the executive branch. These land-related findings helped 
to justify, more broadly, a political-administrative decentralisation of public 
authorities in Kenya. For the first time, an official document issued from 
the circles of power argued for the need to reform laws and harmonise 
them through the development of a national land policy.
The appointment of this Commission also galvanised the transnational 
network (of which the KLA was part and parcel) of Kenyan and international 
activists, aid professionals, and consultants who had previously been 
waiting in the shadows of a regime, seemingly impenetrable to change, for 
the window of opportunity (Kingdon 1984; 2002) to convey new narratives 
21. The creation of a Land Alliance is not unique to Kenya but is part of a 
regional or sub-continental strategy. Land Alliances have been created in 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda, still under Oxfam GB’s 
impetus, at the start of land reform formulation processes, to federate NGOs and 
thereby strengthen their advocacy capacity.
22. These are consultants, experts or academics recruited by international 
organisations, and / or activists operating in connection with the aid system.
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and references to the government forum to fuel the process of change. Both 
the Njonjo Report (Republic of Kenya 2002) and the first version of the 
constitutional text, a document called “The People’s Choice” (CKRC 2002), 
were partly dependent on the contributions of the Law Professor H. W. O. 
Okoth-Ogendo, building stone of the transnational network. The KLA also 
significantly contributed to the production of these two documents. Since 
its founding in 1999 and during the decade of land reform law formulation, 
it was funded to produce research and foster the development of a policy 
incorporating provisions that “international standards” recognise as pro-
poor.23
In 2002, the electoral debacle of President Moi’s heir apparent Uhuru 
Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta, sanctioned the first political alternation, 
as well as the demise of KANU, the independence party. The rise to power 
of the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC), a coalition of opposition 
parties and KANU’s dissenters, seems to have been crucial for the start 
of constitutional reforms as a result of the relative injection into the state 
machine of personalities from civil society (Anderson 2003).
At the dawn of the electoral victory of the NaRC, a group of donors24 
initiated an intense collaboration with the Ministry of Lands to jointly 
design the methods of formulation of the NLP.25 The so-called National 
Land Policy Formulation Process (NLPFP) was fully funded by donors. They 
established a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Lands, 
held regular consultations with senior officials of the Ministry, and recruited 
consultants to manage the budget and support the conceptualisation of the 
land policy text.
23. It should be noted that the terms and contents of land reforms in so-called 
developing countries have historically been debated primarily between bilateral 
and multilateral donors (and only to a lesser extent with the governments 
concerned), who discuss the best formula for economic growth. This was true 
until the turn of the twenty-first century, when the focus was instead on poverty-
reduction strategies ideally formulated through involvement of key stakeholders 
(see, for example, Mosse & Lewis 2005). In this overall framework, the KLA, like 
other Land Alliances in Africa, is indeed an emanation of this specific historical 
moment when some development aid agencies tried to formulate alternative 
models to the dominant dogma of privatisation and the primacy of the market 
(see Toulmin & Quan 2000). 
24. The Development Partners Group on Land is made up of UK Aid, Irish Aid, 
Swedish International Development Authority, USAID and UN-Habitat.
25. The Minister of Lands at the time, Amos Kimunya, was not a politician, 
but a chartered accountant who had chaired the professional organisation of 
accountants in Kenya and had also been a consultant for British cooperation. It 
was the advent of new players in high-level positions, such as Kimunya, who had 
some familiarity with donors, which no doubt made the start of reforms possible.
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In this context, it is instructive to put the NLPFP in perspective with 
the constitutional revision process. Although both processes involved to a 
certain extent the same actors and produced the same content, the constituent 
conference was fully funded by the Kenyan government and became the 
scene of consequential political bickering, while the NLPFP was apparently 
immune to conflict. The unprecedented collaboration of NGOs with the 
Ministry of Lands produced a document partly traversed by decolonising 
motives, asking, for example, for the legal recognition of local land rights 
of rural communities (based on the conceptualisation of the legal category 
of community), and the comprehensive treatment of historical injustices, 
thus endorsing a principle of social justice which, for some stakeholders, 
remained very dangerous.26 The political stakes of the NLPFP process were 
nonetheless highly significant,27 even if they were relatively shadowed by 
the strong politicisation of the constituent conference. This is explained by 
the fact that politicians were the main absentees of the NLPFP, while they 
dominated the last phase of the constituent conference. The NLPFP was 
led by transnational actors; only a few Ministry of Land bureaucrats were 
involved. The final version of the land policy was completed in 2007, but it 
would take two years before Kenyan government institutions endorsed it.
In this context, it is important to relativise the fall of KANU and the rise 
to power of the NaRC government as catalysts of change. It is true that 
following the political alternation of 2002, the process of formulating the 
NLP started, and the process of constitutional revision, which President 
Moi had interrupted before the December  2001 general elections, was 
revived. However, the reluctance of some parts of the coalition to work for 
change was visible as early as in 2005, when internal disruptions stalled the 
reform process. The NaRC was, in effect, composed of two political forces28 
that joined hands by political expediency (to get rid of Moi), though de 
facto remained divided. Their honeymoon was very short, and discord in 
the constitutional referendum of 200529 was visible. The intra-government 
26. See the report of USAID on the analysis of the NLP (USAID 2009 [2008]).
27. One need only refer to USAID’s lobbying activity that tries to convince DfID 
to stop supporting KLA.
28. On one side, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Mwai Kibaki, former 
executive of KANU, who in 2002 became president; on the other side, the 
National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) of Raila Odinga, opposition leader, 
who had allied with KANU's dissident fringe because of the promise of creation, 
through the constitutional revision, of a prime minister position. A two-headed 
government was therefore formed, allowing the coalition to self-perpetuate.
29. Mr. Kibaki broke his promise at the Constitutional Conference by leaning 
towards a strong presidentialist. The constitutional draft was changed by the 
Attorney General, Amos Wako, just before being submitted to the popular vote 
(hence the name of this version of the constitutional text, the Wako draft).
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feud froze the reform process until 2007, during the presidential elections 
in December, which plunged the country into interethnic clashes in 
Nairobi, in the Rift Valley, and other places throughout the country. The 
peace agreement materialised from a power-sharing agreement between 
the two parties, who committed to the fulfillment of constitutional reforms 
(including land reform) in order to restore peace in the country. The 
NLP was adopted in December 2009 by Kenyan Cabinet and Parliament; 
in the same context of the end of the crisis, the new Constitutional was 
promulgated in August 2010 via referendum.
Both interviews and observations as well as the re-reading of 
historical events from 2000 to 2010 show that the entire process of land 
reform elaboration (six years for the NLP, and approximately ten for the 
Constitution) suffered the ups and downs of partisan ruptures and re-
compositions of the Kenyan political system. Indeed, if the reform agenda 
had fed on the political violence of the 1990s (Njonjo Commission appointed 
in the wake of commission reports investigating the causes of conflict in the 
1990s), it was the brutal resurgence of conflict arising from local arenas at 
the centre of the national scene in 2007 (Boone 2014) that made it possible to 
unblock the political impasse crystallised by the 2005 referendum rejecting 
the Constitution. It seems that the transitional government created in 2008 
had no other choice but to endorse the constitutional text in order to fulfil 
its commitments to restore peace in the country.
The reform of land governance was, in this sense, imposed (by 
concomitant internal and external forces) upon a political class that was at 
reluctant to reform the land administration because of the historical system 
of territorial control and centralised authority over land rights in place since 
colonisation. The initial relative enthusiasm of the incoming government 
(especially between 2003–2005) may have reflected an initial desire both 
to stand out from the past and probably also to recast political alliances 
through, among other things, the restructuring of land governance. Yet, 
the overhaul of land governance systems would prove too expensive (in 
political terms), especially for the bureaucratic establishment. The analysis 
of negotiation of norms during the formulation of land laws, meant to enact 
constitutional principles, corroborates this assumption, as illustrated here 
below.
3. Inter-Institutional Impasse or Necessary 
Adjustments?
As we have seen, the report issuing from the Njonjo Commission served 
as a reference for the development of the National Land Policy. The 
content of the land chapter of the Constitution is also inspired by the 
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recommendations of this report. The commission of inquiry indicated that 
the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the President 
and Commissioner of Lands (appointed by the President), particularly with 
regard to land allocations, was among the most blameworthy elements of 
the system of land governance. Several pages of the Njonjo Report describe 
this system of land administration as vulnerable to political interference. 
Another commission of inquiry—the Ndung’u Commission, named after its 
chairman, Paul Ndung’u30—appointed by the NaRC government in 2002 and 
charged with investigating fraudulent land allocations, also unveiled the 
many methods of abuse of an excessively concentrated and personal power.
Indeed, by virtue of the land laws previously in force (like the 
Government Lands Act), the President had the right to dispose of public 
lands (then classified as government lands) and to delegate this power 
to the Commissioner of Lands. Both ignored the “public interest” clause 
that was to govern such measures: they allocated public land to clients of 
the regime. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as land grabbing 
in Kenya. The omnipotence of the President and his Commissioner was 
illustrated in the jargon of the sector by the expression “green pen.” In 1997, 
during a parliamentary debate on the revision of the Constitution, the (then 
opposition) MP Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o,31 declared:
Mr. Speaker, Sir, we must, in the new Constitution, ensure that we are no more 
enslaved by this presidential authoritarian system. From the moment the new 
Constitution comes into being, no President in the Republic of Kenya should 
be a demi-god. No President should have the power of taking a green pen 
and signing a piece of paper and bequeathing to an individual thousands and 
thousands of acres of lands of Kenyans. (National Assembly, Official Report. 
The CKRC Bill, the 14th of October, 1997.)
On the basis of these findings, the recommendations of the two 
commissions converged on the establishment of a new institutional 
framework that would bring efficiency, transparency, and accountability to 
the land administration system, thus converging towards the establishment 
of an independent commission, the National Land Commission (NLC), 
30. It is instructive to note that the KLA Director was also appointed a member 
of the Ndung’u Commission, which confirms the success of his organisation in 
integrating institutional forums for debate and the development of public policy 
solutions and tools.
31. This politician was, by the time of writing this paper, Governor of the 
Kisumu County, at the time of the quoted speech, a member of Ford-Kenya, the 
progressive wing of the NaRC, among the members of the coalition from the 
ranks of civil society; he was indeed a professor at the University of Nairobi then 
head of programs at the African Academy of Sciences in Nairobi.
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responsible for the management of the public and community land domain.32 
This mandate would be included in the articles of the NLP, from 232 to 238 
(Republic of Kenya 2009), thus envisaging the creation of a constitutional 
body, independent from the Ministry of Lands, accountable to Parliament 
and composed of eight commissioners33 with strong powers. The NLC was 
supposed to administer all public lands, establish a register of all land areas, 
exercise the compulsory acquisition of property, and establish and manage 
the National Land Trust Fund, a fund that was to finance the implementation 
of several reform processes, such as the resolution of historical injustices.34
Through these recommendations, the historic mandate of the Ministry 
of Lands was drastically reduced and even stripped of strategic functions, 
such as those related to land registration. However, the profound 
restructuring of the mandates and institutional powers proposed by the 
NLP had less legislative than programming value. The whole challenge of 
the work of the activists and members of the advocacy coalitions was to 
ensure that the contents of the NLP be included in the final version of the 
constitutional chapter on land in order to ensure its future implementation. 
In August 2010, following the meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Land and Natural Resources in Naivasha to revise the constitutional text 
in order to resubmit it to the referendum vote, certain crucial functions 
attributed to the NLC were excluded from its jurisdiction. This included the 
clause giving the Commission the right to manage community and private 
lands35 as well as the clause giving it the power to co-execute (with the 
Ministry of Lands) the land registration program. In this respect, the final 
32. Regarding (unregistered) community lands, the Njonjo Report agreed on the 
relevance of securing this land area through the legal recognition of customary 
land practices. The report also pointed to the abuses of the trusteeship model, 
a system whereby community lands were held in trust by local authorities, 
the County Councils, which eventually allocated these lands by confiscating 
them or giving them as concessions to private investors, while robbing the 
communities. Lastly, it recommended that the registration of community lands 
be under the jurisdiction of the decentralised bodies of the NLC.
33. The commissioners are recruited by competition, and their appointments 
are sanctioned by Parliament to ensure that recruitment reflects the imperatives 
of representation, experience and integrity: Republic of Kenya (2009); art. 232.
34. Similarly for the decentralised entities of the NLC, the County Land 
Management Boards, whose members were to be accountable to county 
parliaments. They were assigned crucial functions by the NLP in land 
administration, such as land use planning, land registration, record keeping of 
land transactions, and the issuance of titles: ibid., art. 241-246.
35. “Art. 84(2)(c) to advise the national Government and devolved governments 
on a policy framework for the development of selected areas of Kenya, to ensure 
that the development of community and private land is in accordance with the 
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version of the constitutional chapter conferred on the NLC only a meagre 
role of advisor.36
These last-minute revisions made little contribution to an unequivocal 
reading of the respective mandates of land institutions. They were 
mainly used to trigger endless disputes over the “real” perimeter of the 
NLC’s mandate, and by extension the Ministry’s, and the formulation and 
enactment of laws defining in detail the functions of the Commission. The 
NLC Act was enacted in 2012 in conjunction with two other land laws 
(the Land Act and the Land Registration Act). Although the process of 
formulating these laws has been described by academic Ambreena Manji 
(2013) and other stakeholders (including NGOs) as yet another attempt 
by the political establishment to obstruct the reform process, these laws 
broadened the NLC’s mandate by restoring to it some of the functions of 
which it had been relieved by the politicians at the Naivasha meeting.37 
Some confusion nevertheless resulted from the non-repeal of laws dating 
from the old regime (pre-Constitution 2010) in contradiction with the new 
legislative provisions.38 This laid the foundation for an inter-institutional 
conflict fought with obstructionism, polemical statements in the press, and 
above all litigation to tip the scales of interpretation of norms.
Controversies related to these land laws began as soon as they were 
formulated. The work of the Ministry’s consultant to draft the laws (a 
Kenyan, head of a notorious law firm in Nairobi) was harshly criticised 
by KLA and its members, who accused the consultant of writing the laws 
by “copying and pasting” Tanzanian land legislation. In addition, land 
laws were introduced into Parliament very late, two weeks before the 
constitutional deadline. The KLA and the surveyors’ body, Institution of 
Surveyors of Kenya, then protested against the lack of public consultation 
during the formulation of these laws. These organisations then requested 
development plan for the area.” Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review. 
2009. Harmonised Draft Constitution, Published on 17th November: 48.
36. “Art. 83(e) to advise the Government on, and assist in the execution of a 
comprehensive programme for the registration of title in land throughout Kenya 
(Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review 2009). We have highlighted the 
deleted words in the final version of the Constitution.”
37. Namely: “Art. 5(2)(b) monitor the registration of all rights and interests in 
land; (e) manage and administer all unregistered trust land and unregistered 
community land on behalf of the county government” (Law of Kenya, National 
Land Commission Act, No. 5 of 2012). Moreover, management of land registries 
was conferred upon it by Articles 6 and 7 of the Land Registration Act (Law of 
Kenya, Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012).
38. For example, the Adjudication Land Act, according to which the Ministry of 




and obtained a sixty-day deadline extension. Thus, debates about land laws 
continued within and beyond Parliament, but it seems, without inscribing 
in the body of laws a legal distinction between the roles and functions of 
land governance institutions. Indeed, in May 2012, after enactment of the 
laws, the President of the NLC, university professor Mohamed Swazuri, 
appointed a taskforce to identify provisions that were contradictory or 
inconsistent with other laws in order to propose amendments.39 Thus, 
barely enacted, the land laws were already in the process of being amended.
It was only in 2015, two years after the establishment of this taskforce, 
which was supposed to report on its work within three months, that the 
Land (Amendment) Act was published by the Ministry of Lands and not 
by the NLC. It is important to note that the 2013 presidential elections saw 
the rise of Uhuru Kenyatta, who was elected president of Kenya at the 
head of a coalition government (Jubilee Coalition) with William K. Ruto, 
leading to a fundamental transformation of the partisan opposition game.40 
Unlike in the days of the NaRC, the Jubilee government adopted a decidedly 
conservative approach to land management, returning to the promotion 
of individualised land titles as an instrument of “unblocking” economic 
capital.41 The Jubilee administration made the title deed into an ideological 
foundation, which went hand in hand with business and private enterprise 
incentives, typical of its neoliberal approach. It is clear that the political 
environment was no longer conducive to the discussion of NLP’s principles 
of social justice, especially considering that NLP’s decolonising intentions 
may have been detrimental to the private interests of the Kenyatta family, 
who were beneficiaries of the Mzee-era allocations.
From 2013 to 2016, during the elaboration of amendments to the land laws, 
relations between the land institutions of the old and new regime further 
deteriorated. Ellen Bassett (2017) described the successive developments of 
the tension of these relations. It would seem that as soon as the NLC’s eight 
members were appointed in 2013, the government was reluctant to support 
the new institution.42 Not only did the High Court require the President to 
39. Gazette Notice No.7503. 2012. The National Land Commission Act (No. 5 
Of 2012) Taskforce to Develop Rules and Regulations under the National Land 
Commission Act, Dated the 28th May, 2013.
40. The Kalenjin and the Kikuyu became national allies, benefitting from a 
demographic majority due to ethno-regional alliances that were apparently 
decisive during elections in Kenya.
41. It is instructive to observe that in 2014–15 and again in 2015–16, the Treasury 
allocated 2.2 billion and 2.9 billion KES, respectively, to the Ministry of Lands 
for the issuance of 1 million land titles (HakiJamii 2015). See also Doyle (2016).
42. The government was also in favour of maintaining centralised administrative 
power within the Ministry, particularly during the enactment of Executive Order 
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publish the names of commissioners in the Official Journal (prompted by a 
complaint filed by a KLA member), but the first budget allocation to the NLC 
from the Ministry of Lands was well below expectations (241 million KES, 
compared to 2 billion envisaged by the NLP).43
A few months before the establishment of the NLC, differences over 
the interpretation of the respective powers became public. The minister 
and the chairman of the NLC both claimed power to register land, issue 
land titles, and manage the resettlement processes of evicted persons. More 
specifically, the debate focused on the signing of land titles, symbolising 
authority in the land sector.44
4. Pro-NLC Mobilisation,  
but Failure on the Historical Land Injustices Test
In response to this institutional and political impasse, NGOs, including 
KLA, aligned with the NLC, creating an opposition front against the 
Ministry, and thereby the government. The Commission thus renounced 
its non-political character when it was defended by NGOs and by some 
representatives of the Council of Governors who joined the anti-old-guard 
front because of the reluctance of the central government to decentralise 
powers, as envisaged by the new Constitution.45 This is particularly true 
in the case of the KLA fundraising campaign from a number of donors 
(including USAID, but also the Ford Foundation and Swedish cooperation) 
for the benefit of the NLC.
NGOs were also very active in supporting the NLC requesting an 
advisory opinion from the Supreme Court in April 2014 (Reference No. 2 
of 2014) on certain aspects of its mandate: two civil society organisations, 
Katiba Institute and Haki Jamii, who specialise in legal advice, declared 
themselves amicus curiae in favour of the NLC. The verdict, issued on 
December  2, 2015, clarified the roles of the two institutions, and on the 
thorny issue of the issuance of titles, the Court stated that, although 
N.2/2013, when the Kenyan executive gave the Ministry a mandate that rendered 
the existence of the NLC meaningless.
43. Indeed, the budget allocation to the NLC was the prerogative of the Ministry, 
but only until 2015-2016, when Haki Jamii, a member of the KLA, registered a 
29% increase over the previous year (with allocations of 896 million KES and 
1.153  billion  KES, respectively), which remained undersized but increasing 
(HakiJamii 2015).
44. Mutambo, Aggrey. 2014. “Confusion Mars Land Ownership Transfers.” 
Sunday Nation, 2 February. https://nation.africa/kenya/news/confusion-mars-
land-ownership-transfers-944944 [archive].
45. For more details on governors’ positions, see also Bassett (2014).
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the involvement of the NLC in the preliminary stages of land allocation 
was not under discussion, the signing and issuing of titles remained the 
mandate of the Ministry.46 The NLC and the Ministry then jointly set up 
an inter-ministerial commission so that its members could interpret and 
operationalise the verdict of the Court. It was therefore an interpretation 
of interpretation, or as the chairman of the NLC sarcastically defined it, the 
opinion of a “Superior Supreme Court”47—a formulation that denounced the 
legalistic approach of senior Minister of Lands’ officials seeking to dilute 
the role of the Commission.
If the civil society was convinced that the NLC was going to spearhead 
change, the positioning of some of these NGOs was recalibrated as of 2015 
because the NLC failed the test of historical land injustices (HLI). Due to 
its constitutional mandate to begin investigations into injustices, the NLC 
formally announced on May 20, 2014, the formation of a taskforce to conduct 
hearings and public consultations to define the scope of injustices and to 
propose a law systematically dealing with land grievances. Expectations 
were high: this working group had awakened the hopes of Kenyans.48 
Nevertheless, nine months later, when the HLI bill was presented to the 
public, it was rejected by NGOs, including the KLA.49 The taskforce was 
disappointing, first, because of its composition: two members had been 
singled out, accused of being “beneficiaries of injustices.”50 In addition, 
the public hearing seemed to have been conducted in a rushed manner, 
sometimes reduced to a brief visit to the counties, where participants 
sometimes lamented that they had not received any preparation regarding 
the questionnaires distributed during the hearings,51 on which the bill 
should have been based. The drafting of the bill was eventually entrusted 
46. Musa, Kurian. 2015. “Supreme Court: The National Land Commission Has 
no Mandate to Issue Land Title Deeds.” The Standard, 2 December. https://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/nairobi/article/2000184276/supreme-court-national-land-
commission-has-no-mandate-to-issue-land-title-deeds [archive].
47. Interview with Mohamed Swazuri conducted on April 4, 2016.
48. Burrows, Olive. 2014. “Historical Land Injustices to Be Resolved ‘Once and 
for All.’” Capital News, 1 September. https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/09/
historical-land-injustices-to-be-resolved-once-and-for-all/ [archive].
49. “Draft Bill Proposes Tribunal to Address Historical Injustices.” 2015. Daily 




51. “Taskforce on Historical Land Injustices in Marsabit.” 2014. Marsabit Times, 
16 October. https://marsabitimes.com/task-force-on-historical-land-injustice-in-
marsabit/ [archive].
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to a consultant who did so without taking into account the public hearings 
report, only compiled a posteriori because of the criticism. Moreover, the 
bill merely established an ad hoc tribunal expected to tackle the cases of 
historical injustices. This amounted to relieving the NLC of its constitutional 
mandate by delegating it to another entity whose establishment would 
have called into question the relevance of the NLC.
Because of all these criticisms, the bill was shelved. To fulfil the 
constitutional mandate of the NLC, a shortcut was to be found: as part 
of the amendments to the 2016 land laws, the NLC was conferred the 
power to investigate and deal directly, on a case-by-case basis, with the 
complaints and historical grievances, without however a comprehensive 
legal framework to which refer to. All the amendments to the 2012 land 
laws were enacted on August  4, 2016. Ultimately, the NLC found itself 
deprived of its decentralised bodies, while the most strategic functions were 
attributed to the Ministry, such as the management of all land transactions 
as well as the registration of so-called community lands.52
Conclusion
The reform of the land system would not have been put on the Kenyan 
agenda in the early 2000s if different dynamics, both domestic and 
international, had not converged fortuitously at the very moment when 
policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon 1984), operating within the framework of 
transnational networks, were able to seize the “window of opportunity” 
that was offered to them. The analysis of these accidentally-convergent 
dynamics helps to unlock the black box of decision-making to comprehend 
institutional change as itinerant, contradictory, and decidedly hybrid.
The case of the Kenyan land reform highlights the fact that the “window 
of opportunity” is contingent and does not last long, as shown by the political 
vicissitudes in 2005 and 2007, as well as the successive changes made to the 
texts of the land reform. Secondly, the political economy of the decision-
making process revealed the multi-scale power dynamics in which the 
decision-making machine is embedded, in Kenya as elsewhere. The legal-
institutional processes of policy-making have been put into perspective 
with political contingencies to show their intertwining: partisan power 
struggles, the weight of personalities, and individual interests participated 
in the negotiation of norms and of the political-legal status of the actors of 
the reform process.
52. For an empirical discussion of the reform of land tenure categories, namely 
the attempts to instigate a paradigm shift, moving from the land trust model 
introduced at the time of colonisation to the recognition of a “community” legal 
personality, see Di Matteo (2017).
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Policy and politics are very closely linked, as the process of developing 
land reform in Kenya has been the source of intense political activity 
resulting in alliances, ruptures, and many re-compositions. This case study 
challenges a conceptualisation of the decision-making process as eminently 
technocratic, depoliticised or extroverted, especially in an African country 
under aid-regime. The stalling of contemporary land reform in Kenya 
must be understood in a historical perspective so to account for the multi-
dimensional politicisation processes of issues, procedures, and actors 
themselves. The in-depth analysis of the multiple processes and power 
struggles leads to relativise the concept of “resistance” and to consider the 
complexity of the “land question” from its historicity and its entrenchment 
in the power dynamics structuring the Kenyan state and polity. If, on the 
one hand, it appears that political and land institutions are strongly defined 
by habitus and neo-patrimonial practices, we can see, on the other hand, 
that the institutionalisation of change and democratic practices is not a 
clearly linear process, which is reflected in particular in the reluctance 
of some NLC commissioners to confront the spectres of corruption and 
historic land grievances.
This chapter has benefited from the advice of many researchers whom I would 
like to acknowledge: Claire Médard, who reviewed and commented on several 
versions of this article, as well as Philippe Lavigne Delville, Catherine Boone 
and the editors of this book, notably Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle and 
Marie-Aude Fouéré, who offered valuable advice. Omissions and inaccuracies 
are my responsibility.
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